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ill London overtake New York as the world's financial center?
London as
Del aware?
By ADAM C. PRITCHARD
University ofMichigan
n the United States, state corporate law determines
most questions of internal corporate governance -
the role of directors; the allocation of authority
between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc.
- while federal law governs questions of disclosure
to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements,
and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions
by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this
dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state
law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate
governance outcomes.
The allocation to the states of primary authority over cor-
porate governance has created a regime of "issuer choice" in
state corporate law. Corporations can choose the law of the
state that best suits the needs of their directors, managers, and
shareholders, without regard to where the corporation prin-
cipally does business. States can compete to attract firms by
offering the most attractive menu of corporate law rules.
This competition for corporate charters is not just about
state pride: states that attract incorporations are rewarded
with tangible benefits in the form of charter fees.
Critics of issuer choice argue that states compete by pan-
dering to corporate managers. These critics charge that states
are caught in a "race to the bottom," catering to management
by providing rules that promote management entrenchment
at the expense of shareholders. On the other side, advocates
for state control over corporate governance respond that
competition between states for corporate charters generates
a "race to the top": competition in the capital markets com-
pels managers to offer shareholders corporate law rules that
effectively constrain managerial overreaching.
Whether the race is to the top or the bottom, Delaware has
prevailed. That state draws a clear majority of the nation's
largest public companies to incorporate under its corporate code,
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despite its relatively small share of the national economy.
Lately, the topic of jurisdictional competition has spread
from corporate law to its close cousin, securities law.
Historically, issuers listed their stock for trading on one of the
exchanges in the country where they principally did business.
Improvements in communication, however, have made possible
an international market for stock exchange listings that resem-
bles in many respects the long-standing federal market for cor-
porate charters in the United States. In an era when busi-
nesses are consolidating across national boundaries, the notion
of a corporation having a "home" country seems increasing-
ly archaic. Today, corporations around the world realistically
can choose the location, or locations, where they want to raise
capital. They can also choose where they want their common
shares to trade. They are not limited to their "home" country
in making these critical business decisions, and the capital-rais-
ing decision need not be linked to the listing decision.
As of today, the primary contenders in the listing market
are New York and London. Which city is likely to prevail in the
long run? This international question can be explored
through the historical lens of our domestic competition for
corporate charters. Delaware has prevailed in that competi-
tion by being highly attuned to demands by directors who
choose the site of incorporation. That responsiveness is driv-
en, in part, by its small share of the U.S. economy. Delaware
has very few public companies headquartered there, which
limits the number of managers and shareholders who might
seek to influence the direction of its corporate law.
Translating this insight to the market for exchange listings,
London is the smaller, and therefore potentially more nimble,
of the two primary international contenders. Should we expect
the David of London to prevail over the Goliath of Gotham?
THE DELAWARE ADVANTAGE
The competition for corporate charters is largely bilateral:
states compete with Delaware in an effort to retain corporate
charters. Delaware does not compete on price: its incorpora-
tion fees are generally higher than those charged by other
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states. Does Delaware corporate law differ from that of other
states in a way that is likely to appeal to directors choosing a
state of incorporation? The differences between the Delaware
General Corporation Law and its main competitor, the Model
Business Corporation Act (adopted in over 40 states) are
slight. Notably, egregious forms of self-dealing are proscribed
by all of the states. So nowhere in U.S. corporate law will we
find the tolerance for kleptocracy that discourages outside
investment in many developing nations.
THE LAW With explicit self-dealing plainly prohibited in all
U.S. jurisdictions, some have pointed to managers' quest for
self-preservation. Anti-takeover provisions are thought to
promote management entrenchment; perhaps these provi-
sions explain Delaware's dominance in the competition for
corporate charters?
Not really. Although Delaware's anti-takeover statute is
generally considered less protective of management than
most other states, the differences in anti-takeover statutes may
have little practical effect. Delaware courts have validated
the use of the poison pill to ward off takeovers, so managers
of Delaware corporations are largely immune to external
threat. Delaware companies get taken over at the same (low)
rate as companies incorporated in other jurisdictions.
In any event, Delaware dominated the market for charters
long before the advent of anti-takeover provisions. Historically,
companies switched their incorporation to Delaware following
its adoption of liability protections for directors. To be sure,
under the corporate law of virtually every state, the combina-
tion of the business judgment rule, stringent demand require-
ments, and broad statutory exculpation provisions means that
directors face vanishingly small probabilities of being held
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personally liable for their acts as directors. Even if the proba-
bility of liability is low, however, directors may take a special
interest in protections against personal liability if the states' cor-
porate law does not differ very much on other margins. Liability
concerns are likely to be salient for outside directors, who have
limited ability to control the firm's litigation exposure because
they do not make day-to-day business decisions. And directors,
after all, make the decision where to incorporate.
THE JUDGES Delaware is also known for its experienced and
expert judges who sit on its Court of Chancery. The low prob-
ability of liability suggests that intervention on behalf of
shareholder interests is not the reason why the state's judges
are valued. Instead, quality judges matter because they produce
litigation outcomes that predictably shield directors. The pre-
dictability of Delaware law is further bolstered by the large
stock of precedents to which its courts can look in deciding
cases. Delaware's combination of expert judges and relatively
comprehensive precedent provides a predictable body of law,
at least on the salient point of the potential for director liability.
If directors of a Delaware corporation are sued, the company's
liability insurance for directors and officers will cover the
costs of the suit and pay any settlement. The directors will not
be out of pocket. Their houses and retirement funds are safe.
The recent Citigroup decision is a timely exemplar of the
Delaware judiciary's predictability. The plaintiff shareholders
sought to hold Citigroup directors liable for failure to mon-
itor the bank's risk taking in the subprime mortgage market.
Chancellor Chandler rejected the claim:
Business decision-makers must operate in the real world, with
imperfect information, limited resources, and an uncertain
future. To impose liability on directors for making a "wrong"
business decision would cripple their ability to earn returns
for investors by taking business risks. Indeed, this kind of
judicial second guessing is what the business judgment rule
was designed to prevent.... [T]his Court will not abandon such
bedrock principles of Delaware fiduciary duty law.
The "bedrock principle" in a nutshell: Delaware courts
will not second guess directors.
THE LEGISLATURE The Delaware legislature does its part to
reassure directors as well. The state constitution requires a
two-thirds vote of the legislature to amend the corporate law.
Moreover, the legislature further enhances predictability by rely-
ing on the corporate bar to screen proposed amendments to the
corporate code. These structural features mean that Delaware's
politicians have largely tied their hands when it comes to cor-
porate legislation. Partisan politics does not get entangled in
the process of corporate lawmaking. Consequently, interest
groups and corporate "reformers" - who have their own agen-
da - face substantial barriers when seeking changes in
Delaware's corporate law.
More importantly, the state's dependence on its charter
revenue stream guarantees that it will not do anything reckless
in the field of corporate governance. Delaware's small popu-
lation ensures that franchise tax revenues will be a significant
& FINANCE
portion of its overall budget. That budget contribution amount-
ed to 15 percent of revenues in 2007. The current financial cri-
sis will inevitably be met with calls for populist retribution, but
Delaware legislators are relatively insulated from the backlash
that inevitably accompanies economic downturns. Insulating
corporate lawmaking from the vagaries of democracy may be
Delaware's most important comparative advantage.
In sum, Delaware's predictability gives comfort to out-
side directors, who can sleep well at night if they serve on the
board of Delaware corporations, regardless of the diligence of
their monitoring. Corporate governance failures will inevitably
be met with calls for draconian reform and, most worri-
somely, the imposition of liability on the directors who were
supposed to be minding the store. Directors of Delaware
firms can be confident that those calls will be ignored. As
Citigroup demonstrates, even amidst one of the worst finan-
cial crises of the century, Delaware directors can rest easy
knowing that they are not going to be held personally liable
for the fallout.
LONDON AND NEW YORK
London was the 19th century's preeminent center of finance,
leveraging its longtime status as a trading center. The city
enjoyed global ties and a deep source of capital, which it used
to finance development around the world. Despite the head
start, London's lead was wiped away by the cumulative effect of
two world wars and the burden imposed by the rapidly disin-
tegrating British Empire. By the end of the second of those two
wars, New York emerged as the world's new financial leader.
NEWYORK'S ASCENDANCE It was not until the 1990s, how-
ever, that the world became small enough to allow New York
to translate its status as a financial center into the ability to
draw stock exchange listings from outside the United States.
During that decade, the New York Stock Exchange and NAS-
DAQ established themselves as trading venues not only for U.S.
companies, but foreign companies as well. New York's status
as the world's leading financial center made it the preferred
destination for companies choosing to cross-list on a stock
exchange away from their home jurisdiction. New York led this
competition through the 1990s, attracting 861 listings by
foreign companies during the decade. London trailed badly,
garnering only 156 foreign listings during the same time
period. In 2000, nine of the ten largest initial public offerings
in the world took place in the United States; nearly half of the
money raised by non-U.S. companies in IPOs came from list-
ing on a U.S. exchange. New York was riding high.
What did New York have to offer that London (and other
jurisdictions) lacked? Listing in New York offered a certain
prestige, demonstrating that a company was "world class."
More tangibly, New York offered liquidity - the city boasted
a deeper pool of investment capital than London could pro-
vide at that time. Listing in the United States also provided
valuable acquisition currency: common stock that could be
freely traded in the United States. For growing companies with
international aspirations looking to acquire publicly held
U.S. companies, having stock that could be used as merger
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consideration offered strategic advantage.
In response to lobbying by the exchanges, the Securities and
Exchange Commission encouraged foreign companies to list
here by relaxing a number of potentially expensive require-
ments. Most notably, the agency allowed foreign issuers to rec-
oncile their accounts with U.S. accounting principles, rather
than requiring a new set of financial statements prepared in
accordance with the U.S. standards. Conspicuously, however,
the SEC did not go so far as to allow foreign companies to
merely comply with the disclosure requirements of their
home jurisdictions. From the SEC's perspective, U.S. standards
were superior; they could be tinkered with around the edges,
but wholesale waiver was not an option. Although the SEC was
anxious to bring foreign companies to U.S. exchanges, it had
In the market for corporate listings,
the United States yielded its lead with the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
to worry about the political backlash that would flow from
a financial scandal involving a foreign firm.
Perhaps this explains why the SEC did not exempt foreign
companies from the anti-fraud rules. Those rules carried with
them the potential for SEC enforcement. More unpredictably,
selling securities in the United States also exposed foreign
issuers to §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, which carry lia-
bility for misstatements made in connection with public offer-
ings, and Rule lob-S of the Exchange Act, which makes com-
panies potentially liable for misstatements even when they have
not been selling securities. That liability risk, so frequently
bemoaned by U.S. companies, made many foreign companies
wary of dipping their toes into the U.S. waters. Indeed, the risk
of private litigation - generally unheard of in other jurisdic-
tions - was frequently cited by the executives of foreign com-
panies as the most compelling reason for not listing in the
United States. Those companies willing to face this risk were
sending a strong signal of their honesty and integrity (or
more cynically, expected lack ofvolatility in their stock returns).
The twin burdens of SEC disclosure requirements and
exposure to securities class actions made listing in the United
States a costly proposition for foreign companies, notwith-
standing the SEC's efforts at accommodation. The fact that
a significant number of companies were willing to pay this
price allowed the SEC to tell a happy story of a race to the top
in the competition for international listings. The best com-
panies sought to list in the United States because it had the
best regulation, the story went. Foreign companies could sig-
nal their integrity by exposing themselves to the rigors of the
exacting U.S. disclosure regime. Left unsaid was the inference
that companies that chose not to list in the United States had
something to hide.
ingly, reversed. After the SEC relaxed standards for foreign
companies wanting to de-list, a flood of companies headed for
the doors. London seized the opportunity; 14 of the top 20
IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange came from outside
the United Kingdom in 2005-2008. By contrast, only four of
the top 20 IPOs in New York came from outside the United
States. At the same time, London's pool of liquidity was
growing deeper as it developed its own community of hedge
funds and private equity.
This reversal suggests that the United States may have
repeated New Jersey's misstep in the competition for cor-
porate listings. Delaware did not start out with the lead in
the market for corporate charters; New Jersey was the first
state to attract companies located out of state in any sig-
nificant numbers. New Jersey stole a march on its peer
states by adopting an "enabling" model of corporate law, one
that emphasized contractual freedom. The state's reputation
as a haven for incorporation was eviscerated overnight,
however, when it enacted new laws at the behest of Gov.
Woodrow Wilson to crack down on business trusts.
Corporations quickly fled south to Delaware, which had
copied New Jersey's original enabling approach. Delaware
grabbed the lead and never looked back. In the market for
corporate listings, the United States yielded its lead with the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Can the UK dominate
the listing market the way Delaware has dominated the
charter market?
IS LONDON DELAWARE?
The UK has a number of characteristics that seem to mirror
the factors responsible for Delaware's comparative advan-
tage. Certainly the financial services industry is critical to the
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THE (BRITISH) EMPIRE STRIKES BACK This happy equilib-
rium for U.S competitiveness did not last. London has over-
taken - and by some measures surpassed - New York. The
switch can be traced to 2001-2002, a period marked by two
signal developments for the U.S. financial markets. First, the
tech bubble collapsed. The United States' thirst for "the next
Microsoft" had seemingly abated overnight, perhaps quenched
by the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. Second and more
tangibly, Congress reacted to the accounting scandals at
those companies by enacting a host of new regulatory require-
ments in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Critically, the SEC was not
empowered to exempt foreign issuers from the reach of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
The flow of foreign companies stopped and, more worry-
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UK, growing from 5.3 percent of the economy in 2001 to 9.4
percent in 2006. The industry employs half a million people
in London alone. From a regulatory perspective, the UK's cred-
ible and responsive Financial Services Authority (FSA) might
be viewed as the securities law analogue to the Delaware
Chancery Court's role in corporate adjudication. The FSA's
"light touch" approach to regulation gives London a pre-
dictability edge over New York, which is subject to the much
more intrusive (and expensive) scrutiny of the SEC. London's
unitary financial services regulator also reduces compliance
costs in the UK relative to those imposed by the splintered reg-
ulatory structure found in the United States, with its alpha-
bet soup of federal and state agencies, regulating broker-
dealers, banks, and insurers.
2002 when the British response to the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom was quite restrained, the British response to the
financial meltdown was conspicuously un-Delaware-like.
Indeed, the UK's actions closely paralleled the populist
backlash against the moneyed classes that emanated from
Washington.
The initial British response was just as muddled as it was
in the United States. As the markets declined in 2008, the FSA
responded by banning short selling for a long list of financial
institutions. This strategy of killing the canary in the coal
mine, lest it die from the poisonous gases, was also pursued
by the SEC, which introduced its own limits on short selling
in an effort to prop up markets. The message for hedge funds
and other liquidity providers was clear: regulators and politi-
With the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress demonstrated that it could not be trusted,
at least in the eyes of foreign executives and directors.
Key to Delaware's ability to maintain and extend its lead in
corporate charters has been the restraint of the Delaware leg-
islature. That body was conspicuous in failing to succumb to
the quest for populist retribution in the wake of Enron and
WorldCom. Less restraint was shown by the U.S. Congress; with
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress demon-
strated that it could not be trusted (at least in the eyes of for-
eign executives and directors). As noted above, the flow of for-
eign companies to New York largely dried up. By contrast, the
British Parliament largely stayed on the sidelines. For its part,
the FSA pushed "best practices" for corporate governance,
backed only by a disclosure requirement for firms that chose
not to follow them. That episode suggested that London
would follow the Delaware example, affording it a compara-
tive advantage over New York on the predictability front.
More recent events, however, suggest that the regulatory
forces in London cannot be so reliably constrained.
Consequently, its recently gained allure for listings may be
more tenuous. Unlike Delaware, which has a small population
and very few public companies headquartered in the state, the
UK, while benefiting from the financial services industry,
cannot completely insulate that industry from the political
pressures (pathologies?) typical of modern democracies.
Britain has many public companies headquartered there,
and a substantial representation among the world's largest
banks. The response to the near failure of a number of those
banks in the wake of the recent credit crisis revealed that the
British democratic process was not immune to the inevitable
quest for a scapegoat.
The British real estate market experienced a bubble that
paralleled the one that fueled the U.S. economy from 2002
to 2007, and the bubbles popped simultaneously. Unlike
cians in both Washington and London believed in the free play
of market forces - until it became politically inexpedient.
When the markets started to go south, policymakers on both
sides of the Atlantic retreated to the old-time faith in gov-
ernment control. (For the record, the effort failed; the mar-
kets continued to plunge.)
As the credit crisis deepened, London, like Washington, was
forced to bail out a number of leading financial institutions.
And like Washington, London quickly followed up government
control with populist retribution. Constituents were angry, and
limits on executive pay were imposed on executives of finan-
cial institutions receiving bailouts on both sides of the Atlantic.
To be sure, no British politician sunk to the level of Sen.
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who recommended ritual suicide for
AIG derivatives traders who received performance bonuses
after the government bailed out the insurance company.
(Never mind that the traders receiving the bonuses were not
the ones who caused the losses.) But British bankers did come
in for vandalism of their homes and cars, not to mention bul-
lying of their children at school. And the bureaucrats now in
charge of the British banks cracked down in myriad irksome
ways, such as limiting the use of car services and requiring
employees to pay for their own meals on business trips. Trivial
matters perhaps, but for productive employees with alterna-
tive options, another factor pushing them out the door.
The message on both sides of the Atlantic was clear.
Regulators told the public that their top priority was to free
up lending markets. They sent a very different message to the
bankers making the decisions about whether to make loans:
if you make risky loans and they turn out badly, we are going
to slash your pay. Not surprisingly, bankers who were subject
to the restrictions responded that they would repay the gov-
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ernments' bailout funds as soon as possible. Banks that had
not accepted money from the government loudly proclaimed
that they would not be lining up at the trough, and that
they would be selling even strategically important assets to
avoid that fate. Credit markets tightened in response.
The governments' message to the small group of bankers
that were actually generating profits for the bailed-out banks
was that they should start looking for greener pastures at the
healthier banks or at unregulated entities. In a situation
where the UK might have distinguished itself by parting
ways with the United States, it instead succumbed to the pop-
ulist backlash. The head of the FSA went so far as to warn that
the bankers responsible for the crisis should be "very fright-
ened" of the FSA; more ominously, he declared that "a prin-
ciples-based approach does not work with individuals who
have no principles."
The contours of that frightening regulation came into
sharper focus with the publication of The Turner Review by the
FSA. The Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Lord
Adair Turner, chairman of the FSA, to review the events that
led to the financial crisis and to recommend reforms. Most of
the proposed reforms, such as increased capital requirements,
in particular for trading books, were predictable. More impor-
tantly, major banks are in no position to resist, given their
dependence on the promise of a government backstop. Most
controversial is the proposal to limit pay structures thought
to create undue risk. The FSA has begun to implement this pro-
posal by banning guaranteed bonuses for bankers, which has
to rank rather low on risk-inducing compensation structures.
It does, however, assuage populist outrage, at the cost of pro-
scribing an important recruiting tool for British banks. As a
political matter, the proposal to expand regulation to cover
entities deemed to be part of the shadow banking system will
face the challenge of those entities fleeing offshore. Underlying
all of these proposals is a newfound skepticism of the efficiency
of capital markets, perhaps auguring a considerably more
interventionist attitude going forward.
THE FUTURE
If the United States and the UK both responded in a heavy-
handed way to the credit crisis, does this make it a wash
from the perspective of regulatory competition? Perhaps in
the short term, but the response does not bode well for
London's long term future.
This crackdown on financial institutions creates the poten-
tial for bifurcating the financial sector into two spheres. The
first, populated by the type of institutions that have populated
the headlines lately, consists of financial institutions deemed
"too big to fail" by the government because their insolvency
would threaten the functioning of the financial system.
Going forward, these institutions are likely to require the
backing of a lender of last resort in order to have credibility
with counterparries. If counterparties lose confidence in the
ability of these financial institutions to perform, these mas-
sive entities can evaporate virtually overnight, as we witnessed
with the demise of Lehman Brothers. The registration of
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as commercial banks
reflected their recognition of that market reality. As the
Turner Review suggests, these large institutions are likely to face
an array of regulation, including considerably more stringent
capital requirements.
The flip side of capital requirements, however, is the lower
profits implied by constraints on leverage. The proprietary
trading that drove bank profits during the boom years was
fueled by leverage. Smaller bets will mean smaller paychecks.
Not satisfied with limiting leverage, regulators may seek to
limit pay directly. Financial institutions will tolerate this
interference only if their business model requires the backstop
of a very deep pocket. And London's pocket is unlikely to be
deeper than New York's. Consequently, London's policies are
unlikely to be more lax than those emanating from
Washington. If anything, London's regulatory crackdown
may be more draconian than the United States', driven by new
directives from the European Union.
How do these developments in the financial services indus-
try affect the competition for listings? Strong banks - com-
mercial and investment - are one source of liquidity, but they
do not dominate trading in the financial markets as they once
did. Moreover, as capital requirements are ramped up for
such entities, they will become even less important as sources
of liquidity because they will need to rein in their proprietary
trading. Traders have headed for the door rather than have
their pay restricted. Where have they gone? To institutions that
have not yet felt the backlash of political retribution.
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds,
and increasingly hedge funds, have become the predominant
sources of investment capital and trading orders. London has
become a leading center for such entities, rivaling New York.
But is the status of those two finance capitals as centers for
institutional investors secure?
Tightened limits on leverage for institutions deemed "too
big to fail" create opportunities for smaller institutions,
whose business models do not require the backing of a lender
of last resort. These entities will be harder to regulate.
Governments are keen to do so in the wake of the financial
crisis; politicians on both sides of the Atlantic put forward
proposals to crack down on hedge funds and other sources
of capital that have mushroomed in the last decade. That
impulse to regulate, however, comes squarely up against the
ever-increasing mobility of such institutions. These institu-
tions can do business in Greenwich or London, but Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, Dubai, Ireland, Luxembourg, and
Singapore, just to name a few, are also potential venues.
Smaller countries, like Delaware in the U.S. charter compe-
tition, are better able to pre-commit to predictable regulato-
ry structures because their economies tend to be underdi-
versified. It is a safe bet that a number of these jurisdictions
will be happy to commit to a "principles-based" regulatory
approach now that the UK has announced a turn toward a
"frightening" regulatory approach.
Regulators are in the business of regulating; naturally they
want to regulate as wide a domain as possible. The bifurcation
between financial institutions that are too big to fail, and
therefore require a government backstop, and those whose
REGULATION FALL 2009 27
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business models afford them greater mobility, challenges reg-
ulators' domains. The end result may well be that regulators
in the United States and the UK wield overarching authority
over financial institutions that are dependent upon govern-
ment bailouts (or may need such bailouts down the road).
These regulators wield such authority, however, at the risk of
shrinking the sector to be regulated. The banks (and similar
institutions) that are too big to fail will be closely monitored;
smaller financial institutions may well flee to more permissive
jurisdictions. Of course, the regulator's impulse will be to try
and suppress regulatory competition through international
agreement on regulatory standards. That goal, however, faces
immense collective action problems, with many countries not
inclined to follow the lead of the United States and the UK.
The flight of liquidity providers is one very real threat to
London's newfound ascendance in the market for listings. The
other threat is improvement in trading technology: stock
exchanges around the world now offer similar speed in exe-
cuting orders, reducing securities trading to the status of
commodity. The best trading systems are no longer the
monopoly of the exchanges, which are hemorrhaging market
share to proprietary trading systems and dark pools. That
same commodification of trading technology - along with
greater access to information about companies in other juris-
dictions - has greatly reduced the liquidity advantages for-
merly enjoyed by the London and New York Stock Exchanges,
which have had to cut fees in response. The value of the
exchanges has plummeted.
Of equal importance to the question of liquidity, compa-
nies no longer need to bring their shares in physical proxim-
ity to investors. Institutional investors, at least, can access vir-
tually any market in the world. Moreover, Rule 144A allows
issuers to access capital in the United States without a U.S.
listing. Why should a company pay for an expensive listing in
London or New York if a listing in its home country allows
it easy access to capital from around the world? For regula-
tors, this means that listing requirements are likely to offer
little leverage as a regulatory tool.
In sum, my argument here is that the international market
for listings has a parallel structure to the domestic market for
corporate charters. Delaware's sustained ability to dominate
that domestic market, however, is not likely to be replicated in
the market for listings. In corporate law, Delaware has been that
market leader since it surpassed New Jersey; in listings, New
York has been the market leader, but its dominance was under-
mined when Congress had its "NewJersey moment" with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. London has now surpassed New York, but
neither market is likely to provide any important listing advan-
tage over a company's home jurisdiction in the long run.
Both jurisdictions have shown that they are willing to impose
regulatory burdens in the face of political pressure. In their
home jurisdiction, companies can at least bring political pres-
sure to bear as a counter to political retribution. In the United
States and the UK, foreign companies are essentially powerless
in political circles. London has not succumbed to the "burn
the witches" mentality seen in Washington of late, but it
nonetheless lacks the credibility to insulate companies from
political influences in the way that Delaware does.
CONCLUSION
For London to dominate in the market for listings as Delaware
has done in the market for charters, it needs to offer a prod-
uct that companies' home jurisdictions cannot easily dupli-
cate. The notion that the world has become smaller is a clich6,
of course, but it nonetheless holds an important insight here.
The world of investment capital shrinks every day, as insti-
tutional investors become more and more willing to look
beyond their home jurisdictions in search of profitable invest-
ments. The lure of New York and London, and the pools of
liquidity that they offer, has diminished greatly in the last
decade, as trading has increasingly become a commodity.
London must look elsewhere to find a comparative advantage.
London bears at least superficial resemblance to Delaware -
the smaller, less populous competitor, heavily dependent on the
financial services industry - but it has shown that it is suscep-
tible to political retribution in the same way that New York is.
Democracy has its virtues, but it also has its costs. Delaware has
prevailed by insulating its corporate law from the ebb and flow
of politics. London may dominate New York with respect to pre-
dictability, but it does not appear to offer substantially more cer-
tainty than companies can get in their home jurisdiction.
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